This week marked the two-year anniversary from TokenScript's conception. This week we are going to revisit express-of-trust and signing of TokenScript. My goal is to integrate previous thinking (including the current github document and our original design records we inherited from May 11, 2018, copied below)
How to assert trustworthiness of a TokenScript?
-- thoughts shared internally to the AlphaWallet team May 11, 2018
There are 2 candidates:
- The owner's key of the smart-contract.
- The private key of a web certificate of the company or organisation starting the smart-contract.
There are a few advantages of using the contract owner's key:
It doesn't force any dependencies - many smart contracts authors are reasonably anonymous; to force them to leave a trace of their identity by applying a web certificate is not our design goal.
The admin key of a smart-contract is intended to last longer - for most contracts, being valid as long as the contract is at work. The web certificate, although can be renewed without changing the private key, is in practice regenerated yearly.
The web certificates have a designated purpose (to secure the website). It may come as a surprise to some administrator users that its use is needed to control the way the world interacts with a smart contract.
When it comes down to trust, we trust the contract owner about their smart contract almost as much as about their definition of how apps should interact with that smart-contract. A webmaster is an external guest invited to the party from the point of view of the smart-contract owner.
Only one signature is needed. Many organisations own more than one websites, and it is not clear which site's key should be used.
However, there are also advantages from the second option of using the website SSL key.
Most people get to know a smart-contract from a website. There should be a way to certify that "this smart contract is recommended by this website". The trust is passed from the website to smart-contracts.
Most SSL certificates are kept in a format that can be easily used for signing stuff. The smart-contract owner's key could be kept in Trezor, which has difficulty displaying a long XML file (it may be an advantage if the user took some strenuous effort to scroll down Trezor 1000 times to verify the XML file being signed is correct).
SSL certificates can be used to sign XML file while Ethereum key might be kept by a security device which can only sign strings starting with "Ethereum Signed Message..." which breaks XML Signature standards.
This document proposes a combined way: signing the XML file from the website's key and 'acknowledge' it from the smart-contract.
First, let's define a new interface:
It either returns a full XML file or returns a hash that must match that of the XML file. In either case, no matter if the XML file is signed or not, it's considered acceptable. As long as the XML file hashes to the hash value returned by the smart-contract, we call the TokenScript "true".
Then, this very XML file may optionally be signed by a website SSL key. If the signature is correct, the website's certificate is verifiable and has not updated, and we call the TokenScript "trusted".
Then, there are cases when an XML definition is outdated, contains errors or for some reason; people are still using it after the smart-contract owner refuses to provide an update to that XML file - typically because the key is already lost. In such a case, a webmaster can provide an XML patch, which updates the True TokenScript, and that update has to be signed by the webmaster. If the True TokenScript was a signed one, and the update is signed by a key certified by a certificate of the same website, it's called "amended".
Finally, if the True TokenScript was not a signed one, or that a contract does not provide getDefinition(), a TokenScript could be signed by αWallet, in which case it is called "rectified".
The priority of selecting TokenScript if there are conflicting versions is the following.
- Category 1. Amended (imply trusted)
- Category 2. True and Trusted.
- Category 3. True.
- Category 4. Rectified.
Let's examine this ordering method by scenarios.
Scenario 1. "He who built The Thorne shall not live to reveal its secret"
Let's say that there is a King of Ether smart-contract: anyone can deposit money and get rewarded by the next deposit, with the condition that the next deposit has to be higher in amount.
For example, Alice deposits 100 Ethers in it. She will get rewarded when another day Bob deposits 101 Ethers in it. Alice gets exactly 101Ether in reward; Bob will be rewarded when, or if, another person comes and deposits more than 101 Ethers.
The smart contract is created by someone called James Brown. However, James didn't believe that his contract can stand the test of time. He lives in a communism dictatorship country where he is punishable in the event that his contract is hacked.
Therefore, he produced a TokenScript file to allow wallets to interact with his smart-contract, yet he did not sign the TokenScript file. The smart-contract spits out the hash of the TokenScript file as a way to validate the TokenScript file. Since there is no signature on the TokenScript file, the TokenScript file can't be "Trusted", but it still can be "True". By our ladder of priority, the only TokenScript file that can be accepted by the wallet is the True one, category 3.
The user who accesses this smart-contract from the wallet is given the security status message "No trust assumed".
Scenario 2. The smart-contract admin key is lost.
Alice started a smart-contract and a website www.alice.com about it. She wrote a TokenScript file and signed it with her SSL key, together with the SSL certificate. The smart-contract is configured to spit out the hash of that very TokenScript file on
The user who accesses this smart-contract from the wallet is given the security status message "as trustworthy as www.alice.com".
For a year it worked fine - the TokenScript file is category 2 on the priority list. Then, like the most smart-contract authors, she lost her owner's key. She still owns the website, though, and the contract is still operational.
She obtained a new SSL certificate and a new SSL key. She signed another TokenScript file. Although she couldn't update the smart-contract with its hash, the wallet recognises that it comes from the same website. It prioritises the TokenScript file over the previous one because it is a category 1 TokenScript file.
As time goes by she has to move to a new smart-contract because she couldn't update the old one, and business changed since. There is no way to destroy the old contract, but she created a new one and updated a new XML file, preventing the users from interacting with the old contract. The new XML file is also a category 1 TokenScript file, with a newer timestamp signed by the same SSL key. Therefore it replaces the old category 1 TokenScript file. The user was introduced to use the new contract from a prompt message defined in the new TokenScript file.
Scenario 3: The smart-contract owner and the website owner isn't the same person.
TTM coin (short for To The Moon!) is a new ICO in town started by CEO John and his brother, CTO Joey. John hired a webmaster to build the ICO website, and Joey wrote the smart-contract. Joey also did some prototype for a new technology he called Sigmund, of which the ICO is about. Both John and Joey are led by their ICO coin buyers to believe that Sigmund is a technology with great potential, giving users the potential to be whatever they want to be.
TokenScript file was released as True and Trusted category 2. Having raised 10 million USD in ICO, John and Joey fought over a Youtube video on who owns the project. John believes that he got the crowd and Joey thinks he owns the contract and therefore the money. Joey decided not to give the money to John, and John, in turn, released a new TokenScript file blocking user's access to the smart-contract. Most simply, John can publish a messed-up XML file to confuse the users unless Joey coughs up the money.
In this case, John's TokenScript file is in category 1 - Amended. Unlike Alice's case, Joey did not lose the smart-contract key. He simply updated the smart-contract to invalidate the previous True and Trusted TokenScript, therefore invalidating the Amended as well, moving it out of the list.
Consider that the action of buying ICO token is done to the contract, although its reputation is assumed from the website, the fact that the contract holds users tokens and funds makes it the trusted party. Coherence between the contract and user's means to access it (TokenScript) is prioritised.
Furthermore, it's more sensible for the wallet to behave as intended by the contract, assuming trust from a website, not that wallet should behave as intended by a website to access a contract. Therefore, a design allowing Joey to have the upper hand wins in the lines of common sense, without judging who is the rightful actor.
Scenario 5: The smart-contract doesn't support
In this case, a Rectified TokenScript is used, which is signed by αWallet team.